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Abstract 
Despite the substantial growth in the Islamic finance sector in the recent years, there has been 
limited empirical research on Islamic equity indices. In our paper we explore the 
interconnectedness between Islamic and conventional equity indices during the period 
spanning from 2006 to 2010. The Dow Jones Islamic Market is representative of the Islamic 
equity market, while the Dow Jones Global and Dow Jones Industrial Average are well 
perceived equity benchmark indices. We adopt hidden co-integration and granger causality 
analysis, while we examine the impact of market conditions. We find that the negative index 
components are significant between the Islamic equity index and the conventional 
benchmarks, yet the two conventional indices do not support this contention. Moreover, there 
is evidence that an increasing in magnitude driving force emanates from the Islamic to the 
conventional index in the crisis and post-crisis periods. A portfolio optimisation case study 
reveals that there are diversification benefits to be reaped by the inclusion of an Islamic equity 
index. The finding is tied to the Islamic index’s performance and diversification benefits, 
particularly during the financial crisis. It may be further linked to investors’ embracing of 
Islamic finance principles on lower leverage and speculation practices. 
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1. Introduction  
The Islamic finance sector has demonstrated resilience and growth as the landscape of 
financial services reshapes. With a compound annual growth rate, since 2006, around 16% 
Shariah-compliant assets are now estimated at $1.2 trillion offered by 349 institutions. The 
consistent growth of the sector reassures that there is appetite for alternative, ethical 
investments, while the 80% of the still untapped customer base ensures that there is scope and 
need for expansion. 
The slowdown in growth (8.7% in 2013 compared to 20.7% in 2012) of Islamic assets, a sign 
of maturity, offers the opportunity for challenges to be addressed. Henceforth, Islamic finance 
needs to tap the potential of retail banking as well as microfinance. Paramount to this success 
would be innovation; in products, services, internal processes and education. Products would 
have to go beyond Murabahah, Ijarah and Profit-and-Loss (PLS) contracts to cater for the 
emerging needs of the, particularly Muslim and of a lower place in the value ladder, 
customers. Investment in human resources has been on the rise but needs to maintain the 
momentum so that issues of service lag and time-consuming procedures are minimised 
(Pellegrina, 2008; DiVanna and Hancock, 2013). Education of any interested party needs to 
ensure that the unique brand identity is further fostered. From an academic viewpoint, 
research has sought to investigate similarities and differences between Islamic and 
conventional finance.  
Islamic banks, for instance, have been much researched in terms of business models, 
efficiency, financial characteristics and stability; see among others Boumedeine and Caby 
(2009), Cihak and Hesse (2010), Beck et al., (2013), Johnes et al., (2013) and Abedifar et al., 
(2013). Islamic equity indices have also attracted empirical research, albeit to a lower extent. 
See, for example, studies of Hakim and Rashidian (2004) and Chen et al., (2004). However, 
the focus of empirical research on this particular field has been on comparative performance 
and long-run relationships of Islamic vis-à-vis conventional equity indices. 
The present paper aims to contribute to the growing empirical literature on Islamic equity 
indices by abridging two, arguably, distinct literatures, Islamic banking and Islamic indices. 
We take a foothold on documented evidence regarding superior performance and resilience of 
Islamic banks, particularly amidst crises. Subsequently, we investigate the impact on the 
interrelation between Islamic and conventional equity indices. We aim to uncover evidence in 
support of the notion that Islamic equity indices are either more appealing in terms of 
risk/return trade-off, and/or less interconnected to the market; hence offering important 
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diversification benefits. We do so by employing hidden co-integration and granger causality 
analysis for the periods before, during and after the global financial crisis. 
We contribute to the extant literature in two ways. First, we provide the first application of 
hidden co-integration to compare Islamic and conventional indices. Therefore we are able to 
compare and contrast asymmetric effects in the dynamics of Islamic and conventional equity 
indices. Second, we provide novel empirical results by documenting the consolidation of 
Islamic equity indices as risk mitigation tools in the investment universe in separate phases of 
the global financial crisis. 
Our key findings may be summarised as follows. We find that positive index components are 
interconnected among all three index pairs. By contrast, the negative index components are 
only significant between the Islamic equity index (Dow Jones Islamic Market-DJIM) and the 
world conventional benchmark. Furthermore, the prevalence of an Islamic index in co-
integration links becomes more significant during distressed times and across time. This is 
verified by the rising significance of the causality relationship between DJIM and Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) hinting that investors are looking for investments less correlated to 
the market. Islamic equity indices are of comparable performance and can help in the 
construction of a well-diversified portfolio especially in distressed times.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The relevant literature review is presented 
in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 present and describe the methodology and data used. Results 
and discussion are presented in Section 5 with a final section to conclude. 
2. Literature Review  
Research on Islamic finance is growing at a steady pace with studies covering bank aspects 
such as, efficiency (Johnes et al., 2013), performance (Hasan and Dridi, 2010), stability 
(Cihak and Hesse, 2010; Beck et al., 2013) and risk types (Abedifar et al., 2013; Baele et al., 
2012). Yet, the main focal point remains the comparison of Islamic to conventional practices. 
A recent line of research investigates the performance differentials between Socially 
Responsible Investments (SRI) and Islamic investments (Abdelsalam et al., 2013). Several 
studies have focused on the accounting and regulation aspects of Islamic finance, see for 
example El-Nahass et al., (2013) and Alexakis and Tsikouras (2009) among others. The 
remainder of this section will focus on the literature closely related to the Islamic equity 
indices and the methodologies applied therein.  
Co-integration analysis has been used extensively in many areas of economics and finance 
featuring applications in the consumption and income relationship; see among others Lettau 
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and Ludvigson (2003) and Campbell (1987), as well as the predictability of asset prices 
(Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), co-existence of bubbles in 
different asset classes (Campbell and Shiller, 1987) and the term structure of interest rates 
(Hall et al., 1992). Several papers complement co-integration analysis with causality analysis 
to test for the efficient market hypothesis. For some applications see among others McDonald 
and Taylor (1988; 1989) and Jones and Uri (1989). 
The separation of bull and bear periods is an interesting topic in financial literature, while a 
growing number of econometric techniques cater for the varying dynamics between the two 
periods. For example, the notion that bad news has more severe effect on financial time series 
than good news dates back to the introduction of EGARCH/TGARCH models by Nelson 
(1991) and Zakoian (1994) that were designed to capture this asymmetric effect on volatility 
modelling and forecasting. For example, Awartani and Corradi (2005) investigate the gains in 
forecasting performance that the allowance for the asymmetric component might bring in the 
case of the S&P 500 index. Their findings show that all asymmetric GARCH models 
forecasts outperform those of the benchmark GARCH(1,1) providing evidence that leverage 
effects bear additional information. 
The number of articles that examine the returns and characteristics of Islamic indices are 
limited. Hakim and Rashidian (2004) compared the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index - US 
(DJIMI) with the Wilshire 5000 Index (W5000) over the 1999 to 2002 period. The DJIMI, 
covering about 75% of the W5000 represents a restricted investment universe which adheres 
to the Islamic finance guidelines. A strong relationship was verified by means of co-
integration and causality analyses between the W5000 and the risk-free interest rate. 
However, such relationship could not be verified for the DJIMI and the risk-free rate or the 
W5000, possibly indicating that factors affecting the DJIMI are different to interest rates or 
broad markets. Therefore, the less diversified DJIMI exhibits unique risk-return 
characteristics that render it unrelated to the broad market without any sacrifice in return-risk 
trade-off from an investor’s viewpoint. 
The DJIMI is the oldest, launched in 1999, and most researched Islamic index. For example, a 
study by Hassan (2000) investigates the efficiency market hypothesis and calendar anomalies 
on the DJIMI over the period 1996 to 2000. The author finds that, contrary to conventional 
indices, no turn-of-calendar year, turn-of-financial year or month effects are verified for the 
DJIMI which may be attributed to the screening criteria and the shun of practices (i.e., short 
sale) typically associated with speculation.  
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Another difference between Islamic and conventional indices is unveiled by the study of 
Sadeghi (2013) which investigates the impact of index revisions on the return and liquidity of 
stocks over the 2006 to 2008 period. Research related to conventional indices has found that 
inclusion of a stock in an index can increase the stock’s asset value by increasing the firm’s 
recognition (Merton, 1987). Chen et al., (2004) and Elliot et al., (2006) offer some case 
studies on the S&P 500 index. By contrast, Sadeghi (2013) finds that the addition of an 
Islamic stock to the DJIMI would have a negative impact on the stock’s value. Perhaps this is 
related to prohibition of engagement in speculative, as opposed to real economy, activities 
under Islamic finance. In a sense, inclusion of the stock in the index may be considered as 
diversion from the Islamic guidelines, while echoing the agency view of Friedman (1996).  
Hussein (2004) compared the performance of the FTSE Global Islamic Index and the FTSE 
All-World Index during the 1996 to 2003 period. The authors divide the period to allow for 
the varying market conditions related to the dot.com crisis. The author’s findings suggest that 
the Islamic Index outperforms the conventional counterpart during the bull market, while the 
opposite is true during the bear market. Overall, there are no significant gains/losses from the 
use of a Shariah compliant index. Therefore the author concludes that the use of ethical filters 
does not have a negative impact on the performance of the FTSE Global Islamic Index 
(Hussein, 2004). 
The rising popularity of Islamic equity indices is evidenced in the recent study of El-
Khamlichi (2013). The author compares and contrasts four Islamic indices published by Dow 
Jones (Dow Jones Islamic Market Index - DJIMI), Financial Times (FTSE Shariah World), 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P 500 Shariah) and Morgan Stanley (MSCI World Islamic) to their 
respective conventional counterparts. Empirical findings are suggestive of diversification 
opportunities related to the Islamic indices of Dow Jones and S&P and their conventional 
counterparts, as evidenced by co-integration analysis. By contrast, the Islamic indices of the 
FTSE and MSCI do not verify this contention. The divergent finding may be related to 
varying Shariah screening filters adopted by the equity companies.   
Investments adhering to Islamic finance guidelines often are grouped under the encompassing 
title of Socially Responsible Investments (SRI). This categorisation opens a new line of 
research which compares the performance of Islamic finance investments to SRI. The study of 
Miglietta and Forte (2007) compares Islamic investments to SRI, the focus being on mutual 
funds and equity indices of both categories via the use of co-integration analysis. The main 
difference is that mutual funds based on Islamic finance are more regulated in the sense that 
they need to abide by stricter rules on what constitutes a permissible investment. On the other 
hand, SRI places more emphasis on issues like environmental protection and social profile.  
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The comparative performance of Islamic and conventional equity funds over the 2005 – 2011 
period in Saudi Arabia is investigated in El-Mosallamy and El-Masry (2013). Using asset 
pricing factor models they find that Islamic equity funds outperform conventional ones. 
However, a crucial limitation of the study is that market conditions are not taken into account.  
Related to SRI, but contributing to the banking literature, the study of Shaban et al., (2013) 
assess the determinants of social responsibility in Islamic banking vis-à-vis conventional 
(both private and public) banks. The authors find that Islamic, similarly to state-owned, banks 
engage strategically in social responsibility actions but for different reasons. For the former 
the reasons lie within the modus operandi and the principles of Islamic finance, while in the 
latter it may be an artefact of politics.   
These studies are of interest and show the way forward in the sense that they seek to uncover 
the underlying differences between Islamic and conventional investments. The impact of 
crisis has brought to surface drawbacks and limitations of conventional practices. Instead the 
resilience of Islamic finance has turned attention to the underlying mechanisms and brought 
to surface risk diversification benefits.  
3. Methodology 
In this section we present the methodology we adopt in the paper. First, we utilise the co-
integration framework of Engle and Granger (1987) to test for a long-run equilibrium in the 
three indices, namely the Dow Jones Global (DJGI), the Dow Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) 
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Second we use the Granger causality test to 
investigate causality presence and direction in the three indices. This would allow us to draw 
conclusions on which index influences another. Third we decompose the indices into a 
positive and a negative component adopting a hidden co-integration framework, in line with 
Alexakis et al., (2013). 
Up to this point the analysis considers the full sample. To allow for varying market conditions 
to have an effect on the interrelationship of the indices we split the sample into sub-periods. 
Instead of relying on ad hoc assumptions about the cut-off date, we implement a structural 
breakpoint test of Bai and Perron (1998) and categorise the sub-periods accordingly. We 
prefer the Bai and Perron (1998) breakpoint test as it does not assume prior knowledge of the 
breakpoint date, as the Chow (1960) breakpoint test, or a single breakpoint as the Quandt-
Andrews (Quandt, 1960; Andrews 1993) and Zivot-Andrews (1992) tests that also exist in the 
literature. The structural breakpoint test is performed on the volatility of the DJIA, which is 
estimated using a GARCH(1,1) model. For the breakpoint identification we rely on the 
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Schwarz information criterion2. The break test approach is to compare the information criteria 
for a model with varying number of breaks in the volatility series. 
3.1 Co-integration models 
Two series ,t tX Y  are co-integrated when they are both integrated of the same order and there 
exists a linear combination between them that is stationary. The basic idea of co-integration is 
that series ,t tX Y  move closely together without deviating one from another in the long run, 










= −   
Where α is the co-integrating parameter and its magnitude shows the co-integrating speed. 
If two variables are co-integrated then according to the Granger Representation Theorem 
(Engle and Granger, 1987), there exists an Error Correction Model (ECM) which is defined 
as: 
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Co-integrated variables in the bivariate case must possess temporal ‘causality’ in the Granger 
sense in at least one direction. For a pair of series to have an attainable equilibrium, some 
causation between them to provide the necessary dynamics must exist. Consequently, one 
important implication to emerge from the co-integration literature is that prices in an efficient 
speculative market cannot be co-integrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). Otherwise, as 
Niarchos and Alexakis (1998) point out, variation in one of the series ,t tX Y  would improve 
the forecasting ability of the other.  
3.2 Granger Causality 
                                                 
2 The break test approach is to compare the information criteria for a model of no breaks up to a 
maximum of 5 breaks in the volatility series. The Schwarz information criterion is minimized (-10.881) 
when 3 breaks.  
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In the Granger (1969) causality framework, series Y is said to be “Granger caused” by X if 
the latter helps in the prediction of the former. This has important implications for portfolio 
rebalancing and trading as an equity index would have precedence over another. Naturally, 
this would imply inefficiency under the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Niarchos and Alexakis, 
1998).  
Two series ,t tX Y  are said to be Granger caused if one can be expressed in terms of lags of 
the other, while these lags are jointly statistically significant. 
0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
... ...
... ...
t t l t l t l t l t
t t l t l t l t l t
x x x y y
y y y x x u
α α α β β ε
γ γ γ δ δ
− − − −
− − − −
= + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + +
 
Where l represents the number of lags. The null hypothesis for the Granger causality test 
assumes that 1 1... 0 and ... 0l lβ β δ δ= = = = = = against a two-sided alternative. Rejection 
of the null hypothesis implies that lags of ,t tY X  carry predicting power over ,t tX Y  
respectively.  
3.3 Hidden Co-integration 
Hidden co-integration models decompose each of the original series into two components, a 
positive and a negative, and subsequently test for co-integration in these components 
(Granger and Yoon, 2002). Positive and negative shocks are defined as: 
max( , ); min( , ); max( , ); min( , )t t t td d d dε ε ε ε η η η η
+ − + −= = = =    
Where d represents a threshold value, usually set to zero, and , ~ (0, )t tε η σΝ          
The two series ,t tX Y  can then be written as cumulative sums of the positive and negative 
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The two series ,t tX Y  are hidden co-integrated if their components are co-integrated with 
each other. Four cases are identified. 
• Neither { , }t tX Y
+ +  nor { , }t tX Y
− −  are co-integrated. Series ,t tX Y  are not hidden co-
integrated. 
• Either { , }t tX Y
+ +  or { , }t tX Y
− −  are co-integrated. Series ,t tX Y  are hidden co-
integrated and they share common positive or negative shocks. 
• Both { , }t tX Y
+ +  and { , }t tX Y
− −  are co-integrated but with different co-integrating 
vectors. Series ,t tX Y  are hidden co-integrated. This implies that the co-integration 
intensity varies between positive and negative shocks. 
• Both { , }t tX Y
+ +  and { , }t tX Y
− −  are co-integrated with the same co-integrating 
vectors. Series ,t tX Y  are co-integrated. This implies that the co-integration intensity 
is the same between positive and negative shocks. 
Once hidden co-integration has been established, a Crouching Error Correction Model 
(CECM) may be formulated. For the case where the positive (or negative) components are 
hidden co-integrated, the CECM may be defined as: 
0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
( )
( )
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
X X Y Y X
Y X Y Y X
β β β ψ η
δ δ δ ρ ξ
+ + + + +
− − − −
+ + + + +
− − − −
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + − +
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + − +
  
If both the positive and the negative components exhibit hidden co-integration, then the 
CECM is defined as: 
       
                                                   10 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
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where k≠1. In the special case that k=1 the CECM collapses to the standard Error Correction 
Model (ECM).  
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δ δ δ δ δ ρ ξ
+ + − −
− − − − − −
+ + − −
− − − − − −
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − +
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Therefore, 1 2ψ ψ ψ= = and 1 2ρ ρ ρ= =   while the coefficients for the positive and 
negative components of the two series should be the same; hence 
1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4; ; ;β β β β δ δ δ δ= = = = .  
4. Data 
We consider two benchmark equity indices, the Dow Jones Global (DJGI) and the Dow Jones 
Islamic Market (DJIM) for the period 03/1/2006 – 31/12/2010. This gives us a sample of 1257 
observations. Stylised facts for this time span feature a period of high volatility related to the 
global financial crisis (mid-2008 to mid-2009) and two low volatility periods; namely a pre-
crisis and a post-crisis. Data are taken from Datastream. 
The weighting for the two indices is based on float-adjusted market capitalisation, while both 
of them cover approximately 95% of the underlying market. Eligible for selection in the DJGI 
are all equities that trade in the underlying markets’ major exchanges. Equities are screened 
for share class and liquidity, while the index is reviewed on a quarterly basis to account for 
de-listings, bankruptcies and M&A activity. The DJIM applies business type and financial 
screening to ensure that featured equities comply with Islamic finance. Businesses in alcohol, 
tobacco and pork-related products, conventional financial services, entertainment and 
weapons are precluded. The main rationale behind financial screening is to ensure that 
companies with large elements of debt and intangible assets are excluded. Although not 
universally standard, financial screenings of Dow Jones ensure that equities are excluded if 
any of the following criteria are in excess of 33%. These are: i) Total debt divided by trailing 
24-month average market capitalisation; ii) Cash plus interest-bearing securities divided by 
trailing 24-month average market capitalisation; iii) Cash and interest-bearing securities 
divided by average market capitalisation; iv) Accounts receivables divided by trailing 24-
month average market capitalisation. 
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Table 1 provides key descriptive statistics for the two indices considered alongside the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) for comparison purposes. Mean return is positive over the 
examined period for all three indices; however the DJIM has outperformed the two 
conventional indices while bearing lower risk. Specifically, the DJIM has a mean return of 
0.013% compared to the 0.005% of DJGI and DJIA, while annualised volatility is 20.45% for 
the DJIM as opposed to the 20.84% and 22.79% of the DJGI and the DJIA respectively. All 
series show the commonly reported stylised facts of being leptokurtic, autocorrelated and 
stationary.   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
5. Results 
Table 2 reports the co-integration analysis results for the log prices of the three indices we 
consider. The Engle-Granger and Johansen approaches verify that all series are co-integrated. 
However, the co-integration is stronger for the pairs containing the DJIM, as evidenced by the 
higher statistical significance. Specifically, the co-integrating pairs of DJIM/DJIA and 
DJIM/DJGI are significant at the 1% significance level, under both Engle-Granger and 
Johansen approaches. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Granger causality results (see Table 3) indicate that there are significant one directional 
causality effects related to the DJIM. Specifically, we verify that past performance of DJIM 
may be successfully used in to forecast both DJGI and DJIA. In addition, we document 
Granger causality from the DJIA to the DJGI.  
A possible explanation for the result may lie within the nature of the companies featured in 
the three indices. Companies included in the DJIM and DJIA would be considered as 
investments of a higher quality, albeit for different reasons. On the one hand, companies in 
the DJIM would have passed all the Shariah related screening process; thus they would be 
expected to be less leveraged and less volatile compared to the DJGI and DJIA. This is 
plausible because financial screening would have eliminated companies bearing a high debt 
component in their balance sheets, while the typically more volatile conventional finance 
firms would not have gone past the business type screening. On the other hand, the thirty 
companies in the DJIA, although many of them are not engaged in the traditional “heavy 
industry”, are considered as international firms of a very high quality and reputation. As a 
result, the DJIA is among the most widely used benchmarks.  
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 [Insert table 3 around here] 
Table 4 presents the output of the hidden co-integration analysis. Estimated coefficients for 
the OLS regressions of positive and negative components of the three indices are reported. 
Overall we find that all three combinations of positive index components (i.e., DJGI/DJIA, 
DJIM/DJIA and DJGI/DJIM) show evidence of a co-integrating relationship. By contrast, 
there is a single pair of negative index components (DJGI/DJIM) showing co-integrating 
evidence. More specifically, the ADF tests on the residuals of each regression (Engle-Granger 
approach) as well as the Johansen co-integration tests suggest that a long-run relation is 
particularly strong between the negative components of the DJGI and DJIM. The little 
evidence of co-integration shown in the positive components of the DJGI/DJIA, DJIM/DJIA 
and DJGI/DJIM pairs of indices is verified only by the Johansen test. 
An economic interpretation of the hidden co-integration analysis may be related to the flight 
to quality effect. During periods of prolonged uncertainty and turbulence, market participants 
rebalance their portfolios and shift to investments less likely to experience a loss of capital. In 
the present context of equity indices, such investments would consist of companies of a 
preferential financial background or operating in a less affected sector. Therefore, companies 
with low proportions of debt, high proportion of tangible assets as well as companies 
operating in the relatively secure heavy industrial or consumer sectors would be preferred. 
However, as the constituents companies of a Shariah compliant index need to abide by 
Shariah restrictions, they would have the desired characteristics. Consequently, an index like 
the DJIM may behave as a safe haven for investors during distressed times. 
It is interesting to note that the DJIA, although a high quality benchmark index, does not show 
similar behaviour to the DJGI during crisis. That is an interesting finding in its own right as it 
shows that investors during times of distress shun conventional practices altogether and opt 
for alternative investments. In other words, during distress investors are not looking for better 
quality in the same universe (i.e., conventional) of investments, which the DJIA may arguably 
offer over the DJGI, they rather seek for an alternative and less interlinked “universe” of 
investments.    
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
5.1 Market conditions 
In this section we repeat the hidden co-integration analysis for the bear/bull periods in the 
sample.   
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Table 5 reports estimated coefficients and standard errors for the regression with structural 
breaks on the volatility series of DJIA. There are four periods identified as calm (4/1/2006 – 
26/7/2007), pre-crisis (27/7/2007 – 4/9/2008), crisis (5/9/2008 – 4/6/2009) and post-crisis 
(5/6/2009 – 31/12/2010). Before the global financial crisis, annualised volatility is at a low 
level of 1.14%, while in the next period climbs to 19.86%. Volatility surges to 42.65% as the 
crisis extends further with the nationalisation of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, two of the 
largest mortgage providers in the USA, the bankruptcy of Merill Lynch and Lehman Brothers 
and the downgrade on AIG’s credit rating. In the post-crisis period, there are signs of 
recovery in the US stock markets, while annualised volatility drops at around 16.60%. The 
financial crisis which brought to surface issues like over-leveraging, deregulation and 
financial complexity has slowly been put behind. However, the world would enter a recession 
phase and a Euro crisis, highlighting issues of monetary and political nature, would unravel.   
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Table 6 reports co-integration results in each of the four periods. Our results show that the co-
integration link between DJGI and DJIM, although highly significant in the calm and pre-
crisis periods, strengthens in the post-crisis period. By contrast, for the DJIM and DJIA pair 
of indices there is little evidence of co-integration in the years up to the crisis period. 
However, in the post-crisis period there is strong evidence of co-integration. This link 
receives renewed interest given the lack of co-integration between DJIA and DJGI.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Granger causality results by market conditions are reported in table 7. We document a 
statistically significant causality relationship from the DJIM to DJGI in the pre-crisis period 
which strengthens further in the crisis and post-crisis periods. Similarly, there is a statistically 
significant causality relationship from the DJIM to the DJIA starting in the pre-crisis period, 
becoming more pronounced in the crisis period, while retaining its significance in the post-
crisis period. By contrast, the causality evidence between the two conventional indices, DJGI 
and DJIA, are mixed. Up to the pre-crisis period, there is a strong causality relationship from 
DJIA to the DJGI which, however, becomes statistically insignificant in subsequent periods. 
Conversely statistically significant causality links from the DJGI to the DJIA are only verified 
for the pre-crisis period. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
This may imply that there are sound benefits to the investors, in terms of diversifiable risk or 
better risk/return trade-off, which may be accessible through Islamic equity indices. The 
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popularity of Islamic equity indices may be evidenced by the rising Market Capitalisation 
figures across the distinct phases of the recent financial crisis (see Table XX8). Specifically, 
there is a 24% increase in market capitalisation pertaining to the DJIM in the years leading to 
the financial crisis, compared to a 2% of the DJGI and DJIA. During the crisis, market 
capitalisation of DJIM dropped by 52% - compared to 38% for DJGI and DJIA – but picker 
up soon thereafter. Financial performance of the DJIM, in terms of risk/return trade-off, has 
been superior to the two conventional indices. Specifically the DJIM recorded about 40% and 
25% less losses during the pre-crisis and crisis periods, while at any point it was neither the 
worst performer (in terms of return) nor the most volatile.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
5.2 Case Study: Portfolio Optimisation 
In this section we examine the benefits to portfolio diversification emanating from the use of 
an Islamic index. Although this is not supposed to be an exhaustive experimentation of 
techniques and possibilities it demonstrates the diversification benefits in a clear and concise 
manner. We adopt the mean-variance modern portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952), albeit 
with a few alterations. Specifically, we allow for time-varying covariance structure among the 
three indices considered, similar to the Yilmaz (2010) paper, and also assess the portfolio 
holdings separately in each of the four periods identified in our sample.  
Portfolio optimisation details, in the more convenient for large portfolios matrix notation, are 
available in any advanced finance textbook; hence it will be mentioned here only briefly.  
Assume 
2
, , , ,
2




a pa a t b t c t
t b p b p t b t b t bc t
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    = = =    
        
R w Σ  
Where R is a matrix with logarithmic daily returns; w is a matrix containing the weights 
assigned to each asset in every period p; Σ is a time varying variance-covariance matrix3. 
Alteration of the weights would give a different return-risk composition, while the Minimum 
Variance Portfolio (MVP) is the only portfolio for which no higher return may be achieved 
without incurring more risk. The portfolio return and risk are respectively: 
                                                 
3 For the estimation of the time-varying variance covariance matrix we employ a DCC-GARCH(1,1) 
model of Engle (2002) which combines the flexibility of the GARCH family of models at the 
univariate level to the lack of the dimensionality curse found in earlier multivariate frameworks, such 
as BEKK and VEC models. 
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* ' * ',p p t p p t pR σ= =w R w Σ w  
Therefore the MVP may be calculated by writing a constrained4 minimization problem and 
solving as: 
* 'min . . 1p p pm s tσ = =w Σw w'1  
Three investment strategies are tested; the first (S1) allows investments in Islamic equity 
indices only (DJIM); the second (S2) allows only for conventional equity indices (DJGI, 
DJIA), while the third (S3) allows for a combination of both Islamic and conventional equity 
indices. Of course such strategy may not be accepted by a Muslim investor as it invests in 
conventional assets but it could serve the diversification purposes of a conventional investor 
who is not interested in the religious aspect per se.  
Table 9 presents the minimum variance portfolios for the three strategies in the full sample 
and each of the four sub-periods5. It is evident that the combined strategy (S3) is the less risky 
strategy irrespective of period, as verified by both risk measures. A pure Islamic strategy 
records higher portfolio returns compared to the other two, with the S3 strategy being second. 
A pure conventional strategy records the lowest return – which is negative in the full period. 
Across the four time periods, a finding of particular interest is that S3 comes closer in 
performance to the S1 strategy. For example, a shift from S3 to S1 in the calm period would 
increase portfolio returns by about 40.5%, while a similar shift in the pre-crisis period would 
increase returns by approximately 21.1%. However, during the crisis and in the post-crisis 
periods the gains from a similar shift are at about 1.6% and 2.7% respectively. A reason for 
this finding may be traced to the weighting that the Islamic equity index has been assigned 
across the periods, which is presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
[Insert Figure YY1 around here] 
6. Conclusion 
                                                 
4 The most important constraint is that the weights sum up to 1. Other constraints may prevent negative 
weights (short sale) or restrict the investment in a particular asset but are not explored here. 
5 We do not explore portfolio re-balancing in the identified periods; therefore average returns and 
average conditional variances-covariances are utilized in the portfolio maximization algorithm in every 
period. We leave portfolio rebalancing strategies as an extension for future research.  
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Islamic finance has been attracting rising interest during the past decade from the 
academic and professional world. Research areas pertaining particularly to Islamic 
banks have received a large slice of the Islamic finance research pie, while important 
findings with regards to efficiency, profitability and stability have been widely 
disseminated. Yet others areas, such as Islamic equity indices, still remain relatively 
in the shadows.  
 
In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between Islamic and 
conventional equity indices. Our aim is to examine if the elsewhere documented 
evidence about Islamic banks are also applicable in Islamic equity indices. Therefore 
we focus on the financial performance of Islamic indices and the diversification 
benefits they offer to investors.  
 
We employ the novel in the area hidden co-integration technique with Granger 
causality testing for three well known global benchmark indices. Our sample consists 
of the Dow Jones Islamic Market, the Dow Jones Global Index (conventional) and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (conventional) studied over the 2006 – 2010 period. 
We segment the sample, using appropriate break detection tests, into four sub-samples 
– calm, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. Subsequently we investigate the impact of the 
global financial crisis on performance, interconnectedness and diversification benefits 
of the indices and complement with a case study on portfolio diversification. 
 
We find that the Islamic equity indices are establishing themselves as an important 
diversification tool to investors. Many findings allude to this contention. First, the co-
integration and granger causality analyses between negative index components reveal 
that the Islamic equity index is a driving force behind the conventional ones, 
particularly after the crisis; thus uncovering a rise in the importance of Islamic finance 
for investors 
 
Specifically, the crisis has highlighted the importance of Shariah compliant stocks 
due to their lower leverage and shunning of conventional financial practices, such as 
complex debt-based financial products. The higher resilience of such stocks to the 
financial crisis is verified by the highly significant causal relationship from DJIM to 
DJGI and to DJIA in the crisis period. The fact that this causal relationship maintains 
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its statistical significance even in the post-crisis period may reflect investors’ 
scepticism and concern about conventional financial practices. It may also be inferred 
from the lack of co-integration and causality relationships of DJGI and DJIA that 
investors’ response to the crisis was not to diversify their portfolios geographically 
(given that DJGI has a wider geographical coverage than DJIA, which is essentially 
restricted to US firms), but to look for alternative investments. 
 
Second, there is a trend in the Islamic equity index’s financial performance which 
becomes more competitive across time with return and risk characteristics bridging 
the gap to the conventional indices. Moreover, the Islamic index surpasses the two 
conventional indices’ financial performance during the crisis and in the period that 
follows. Evidence from our portfolio optimisation case study suggests that a well-
diversified portfolio has an increasing composition of an Islamic equity index in the 
period during and following the financial crisis.  
 
Our findings may have important practical implications for portfolio management. 
Directions for future research include the investigation of a larger set of equity 
indices, possibly with specific sectorial or geographical focus, as well as portfolio re-
balancing techniques. We investigate some of these avenues in future research.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
  DJGI DJIM DJIA 
Mean (%)  0.005 0.013 0.005 
Volatility (Annualised %)  20.84 20.45 22.79 
Max  8.664 9.775 10.508 
Min  -7.160 -8.185 -8.201 
Skewness -0.428 -0.427 0.026 
Kurtosis  9.863 11.751 11.863 
JB  2503.109 4045.612 4110.823 
p-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LB (8)  32.883 35.171 48.638 
p-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADF  -7.390 -19.920 -7.396 
p-value  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The table reports key descriptive statistics for Dow Jones Global (DJGI) and the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) over the period 03/1/2006 – 31/12/2010. JB denotes the Jarque-
Bera test for normality, LB denotes the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test, ADF denotes the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively 
 
Table 2: Co-integration results. 
   DJGI DJIM DJIA  
DJGI     0.809*** 
(0.004) 
 
DJIM   1.175*** 
(0.011) 
   
DJIA    0.927*** 
(0.009) 
  







       
R-squared   90.72 87.77 97.64  
Engle-Granger Approach 
ADF   -3.402** -4.165*** -3.426**  
Johansen Approach 
Eigenvalue   0.016 0.016 0.013  
Trace 
Statistic 
  22.16*** 22.23*** 18.63**  
5% Cr   15.49 15.49 15.49  
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the OLS 
regressions of the log prices of DJGI, DJIM, DJIA on the full sample. ADF refers to the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test for unit root on the residual series. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Granger Causality. 
   DJGI DJIM DJIA  















Notes: The table reports the results of the Granger Causality test on the full sample. Numbers reported 
are F-statistics while number in parentheses are p-values. The null hypothesis is that the index 
appearing in a given row granger causes the index appearing in a given column. For example, the null 
hypothesis that DJIM Granger causes DJGI is rejected at all significance levels. *,**,*** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 4: Hidden co-integration results.  
  DJGI+ DJGI- DJIM+ DJIM- DJIA+ DJIA- 
DJGI+      1.081*** 
(0.001) 
 
DJGI-       1.069*** 
(0.001) 
DJIM+  1.028*** 
(0.001) 
     
DJIM-   1.058*** 
(0.001) 
    
DJIA+    0.898*** 
(0.001) 
   
DJIA-     0.883*** 
(0.001) 
  












        
R-squared  99.95 99.97 99.83 99.89 99.80 99.92 
ADF  -2.121 -6.052*** -1.423 -2.519 -0.380 -1.041 
Eigenvalue  0.038 0.047 0.014 0.004 0.034 0.002 
Trace 
Statistic 
 49.45*** 60.67*** 18.23** 5.98 45.73*** 3.25 
5% Cr  15.49 15.49 15.49 15.49 15.49 15.49 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the OLS regressions 
of the DJGI+, DJGI-, DJIM+, DJIM- and DJIA+, DJIA- on the full sample. ADF refers to the 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller test for unit root on the residual series. *,**,*** denote statistical significance 
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Table 5: Breaks Identification Regression 














Notes: The table reports OLS estimates and standard 
errors in parentheses for the break identification 
regression in the full sample. The dependent variable is 
the GARCH(1,1) volatility series of DJIA. Break 
identification follows the Bai and Perron (2003) 
procedure, while the break estimation is carried out using 
the Schwarz information criterion. Breakpoint dates are 
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Table 6: Co-integration results by market conditions. 
Indices pairs DJGI-DJIM DJIM-DJIA DJIA-DJGI 
Calm Period (n=391 obs)    
Engle-Granger Approach 
ADF -6.823*** -4.837*** -2.733 
Johansen Approach 
Eigenvalue 0.084 0.037 0.018 
Trace Statistic 33.83*** 14.67* 7.283 
5% Cr 15.49 15.49 15.49 
    
Pre-Crisis (n=280 obs)    
Engle-Granger Approach 
ADF -4.640*** -3.309** -2.863* 
Johansen Approach 
Eigenvalue 0.104 0.045 0.038 
Trace Statistic 30.74*** 13.29 14.22* 
5% Cr 15.49 15.49 15.49 
    
Crisis (n=188 obs)    
Engle-Granger Approach 
ADF -3.381** -2.131 -1.021 
Johansen Approach 
Eigenvalue 0.349 0.145 0.036 
Trace Statistic 85.99*** 37.03*** 15.49 
5% Cr 15.49 15.49 15.49 
    
Post-Crisis (n=398 obs)    
Engle-Granger Approach 
ADF -8.248*** -5.557*** -1.882 
Johansen Approach 
Eigenvalue 0.309 0.189 0.016 
Trace Statistic 149.03*** 85.18*** 9.27 
5% Cr 15.49 15.49 15.49 
    
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses for the OLS 
regressions of the log prices of DJGI, DJIM, DJIA on the four sub-samples. ADF refers to the 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller test for unit root on the residual series. *,**,*** denote statistical 
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Table 7: Granger Causality.  
 DJGI DJIM DJIA  DJGI DJIM DJIA 
Calm    Crisis    

























Pre-Crisis    Post-
Crisis 
   

























        
Notes: The table reports the results of the Granger Causality test on the four sub-samples. Numbers 
reported are F-statistics while number in parentheses are p-values. The null hypothesis is that the index 
appearing in a given row granger causes the index appearing in a given column. For example, the null 
hypothesis that DJIM Granger causes DJGI is rejected at all significance levels. *,**,*** denote 
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Calm          
DJGI 0.059 33.16 2.089 -2.510 -0.496 4.291 43.072*** 33.19*** 7,001,906  
DJIM 0.049 36.88 2.323 -2.802 -0.430 4.272 38.319*** 26.69*** 5,951,927  
DJIA 0.056 32.85 2.069 -3.349 -0.619 5.745 147.414*** 15.52* 4,027,050  
Pre-Crisis          
DJGI -0.131 137.53 8.664 -7.160 -0.180 3.883 7.124** 8.30 4,852,015  
DJIM -0.102 155.17 9.775 -8.186 -0.180 4.673 22.927*** 11.96 4,520,620  
DJIA -0.131 166.81 10.508 -8.201 0.196 4.435 17.332*** 12.04 2,822,556  
Crisis          
DJGI -0.077 16.36 3.074 -3.619 -0.118 3.241 1.329 7.17 7,136,976  
DJIM -0.047 15.96 2.860 -3.672 -0.312 3.407 6.478** 13.03 7,603,594  
DJIA -0.066 19.77 3.488 -3.181 -0.028 3.134 0.246 20.11** 4,111,821  
Post-Crisis          
DJGI 0.074 16.61 4.683 -3.163 -0.154 4.515 39.637*** 15.55** 5,891,055  
DJIM 0.074 15.94 4.162 -3.141 -0.170 4.461 37.317*** 14.43* 5,691,257  
DJIA 0.070 15.89 3.825 -3.670 -0.213 4.689 50.307*** 10.90 3,388,824  
Notes: The table reports key descriptive statistics for Dow Jones Global (DJGI), the Dow Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) over the period 03/1/2006 – 31/12/2010. JB denotes the Jarque-Bera test for normality, 
LB denotes the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively 
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Table XX9: Minimum Variance Portfolio Performance. 








        
Fu
ll 
S1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.016% 22.416% 2.307% 
S2 86.63% 0.00% 13.37% -0.007% 20.307% 2.111% 
S3 0.00% 47.83% 52.17% 0.010% 19.073% 1.966% 




 S1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.066% 14.238% 1.378% 
S2 81.82% 0.00% 18.18% 0.040% 10.348% 1.378% 
S3 61.23% 10.69% 28.07% 0.044% 10.310% 1.378% 







S1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% -0.034% 19.175% 2.021% 
S2 93.33% 0.00% 6.67% -0.056% 16.817% 1.798% 
S3 0.00% 48.65% 51.35% -0.042% 15.617% 1.660% 




 S1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% -0.125% 39.411% 4.208% 
S2 97.64% 0.00% 2.36% -0.151% 37.920% 4.080% 
S3 0.00% 54.63% 45.37% -0.127% 34.842% 3.737% 







 S1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.073% 18.173% 1.810% 
S2 50.63% 0.00% 49.37% 0.060% 15.712% 1.568% 
S3 0.00% 35.67% 64.33% 0.071% 15.124% 1.496% 
Notes: Table reports the minimum variance portfolio weights, return and risk in each of the three 
investment strategies for every period. S1 denotes a pure Islamic strategy; S2 denotes a pure 
conventional strategy and S3 allows the investment in both Islamic and conventional equity indices. 
VaR95 is the portfolio Value at Risk at the 95% significance level. Annualized Volatility is measured as 
the average conditional volatility in each period. Conditional variances/covariances are estimated via a 
DCC-GARCH(1,1) model. 
  
       
                                                   30 
Figure YY1. Minimum Variance Portfolio Weights by Period 
 
Notes: Figure shows minimum variance portfolio weights in the full and the four sub-periods of the 
analysis per equity index. Full: 3/1/06-31/12/10; Calm: 3/1/06-26/7/07; Pre-Crisis: 27/7/07-4/9/08; 
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